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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND INCOMPETENCE
OF COUNSEL IN STATE PROSECUTIONS
MARY ELLEN HANLEY
The purpose of this comment is to examine and analyze a group of
recent decisions wherein persons convicted by state courts have sought
writs of habeas corpus in federal district courts on the ground that
the incompetence of counsel representing them at trial worked a depri-
vation of rights secured by the United States Constitution.
The federal reporters contain scores of cases in which persons con-
victed by federal courts have sought writs of habeas corpus, new trials
and reversals on allegations of incompetence of defense counsel. The
regional reporters are replete with decisions by state courts in cases
where convicts have sought direct and collateral relief on similar alle-
gations of incompetence. A complete analysis of incompetence cases
would of course involve examination of these two last mentioned bodies
of cases. However, a separate analysis of cases involving attempts by
state prisoners to obtain release by the federal district courts is war-
ranted in view of the delicate federal-state relationships brought into
play when the state prisoner utilizes the federal forum to launch a
collateral attack on his conviction.
The occasion for this comment is the recent decision of Lunce v.
Overlade1 in which a state prisoner met with at least temporary success
in a federal collateral attack on the competence of his defense counsel.
Charles Lunce and John Reynolds, together with one Thompson, were
charged with the crime of assault and battery with intent to commit
robbery. The Indiana trial court appointed counsel to represent Lunce
and Reynolds. An Ohio attorney who had not been admitted to Indiana
practice was retained by Thompson's family to conduct his defense.
The pre-trial efforts of the appointed attorney consisted of informing
Lunce and Reynolds of the code provisions under which they were
charged, informing them that a conviction could result in a life sentence
and advising them to plead guilty. The appointed counsel was not
present in court for the trial. The Ohio attorney succeeded in getting
a dismissal of the charges against Thompson and then volunteered to
represent Lunce and Reynolds and proceeded to conduct their defense.
The trial resulted in a conviction and sentence of ten to twenty-five
years. The Ohio attorney's attempt to perfect an appeal failed because
he was not versed in Indiana appellate procedure. The Indiana supreme
1244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
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court then directed the public defender to perfect the appeal. On argu-
ment before the Indiana supreme court the only issue was whether due
process of law had been denied to Lunce and Reynolds because the
Ohio attorney was incompetent. The Indiana supreme court gave full
consideration to the incompetence question and affirmed the conviction.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
Lunce and Reynolds then petitioned the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana for writs of habeas corpus. The
petitioners alleged they had been denied due process of law in that
they were represented at trial by an attorney who was wholly unversed
in Indiana law and was without preparation for the trial. The peti-
tioners' specific allegations were that the Ohio attorney failed to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the affidavit,' permitted incompetent and dam-
aging hearsay testimony to come in against them, failed to request
intoxication instructions, failed to object to instructions given to the
jury and failed to save exceptions.
The federal district court dismissed the petition without a hearing
and without requiring the warden to answer. Petitioners then appealed
the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The circuit court held that the incompetence of counsel alleged
by the petitioners resulted in a prima facie violation of constitutional
rights and remanded the case to the district court for a factual deter-
mination.4 As of this writing the district court has not rendered an
opinion.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A federal attack on competence of counsel in a state criminal prose-
cution must find its basis in the fourteenth amendment. It is now settled
law that the sixth amendment guarantee of representation by counsel
runs only to those who are defendants in a federal prosecution. It is
beyond the limited scope of this comment to examine completely the
nature and scope of the constitutional right to counsel in a state trial.'
The present rule, as announced by the Supreme Court in the case of
2 Lunce v. State, 233 Ind. 685, 122 N.E.2d 5 (1954), cert. denied 349 U.S. 960
(1955).3 Indiana criminal procedure permits prosecution by affidavit. Burs' Ind. Sta.
Ann. § 9-1104 requires that the affidavit contain the title of the action and a statement
of facts constituting the offense charged.
4244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957). The federal district court heard evidence in this
cause on December 23, 1957.
5 For a complete discussion of the constitutional right to counsel, see BEANEY, RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955).
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Betts v. Brady,' is that there is no absolute federally guaranteed right
to counsel in a state trial, the existence of the right being dependent
upon the special circumstances of the particular case and found in the
requirement of the fourteenth amendment concepts of fundamental
fairness implicit in due process.
If the circumstances of the particular case are such thaf a denial of
any representation by counsel would be a denial of due process under
the fourteenth amendment it would seem to follow that denial of effec-
tive representation by counsel would also be a violation of the four-
teenth amendment. The right to counsel is substantial and is not satis-
fied by a formal appointment.' But if the circumstances of the case
are such that there is no constitutional right to representation by coun-
sel it is difficult to see how the court can entertain the argument that
ineffective representation by counsel works a denial of due process.
Opinions in some of the Lunce type cases do not discuss whether the
circumstances are such that the fourteenth amendment requires repre-
sentation by counsel. Those opinions which do treat of the problem
dispose of it in one of three different ways: (1) by disavowing concern
with whether the petitioner was constitutionally entitled to counsel,8
(2) by pointing to the presence of a state right to counsel,' and (3) by
recognizing that the existence of a constitutional right to counsel is not
absolute and depends on circumstances of the particular case."0 The
opinions which refer to a state requirement that an accused by repre-
sented by counsel do not discuss the relevance of the state-created
right. Denial of a state right to counsel could not be found to raise a
federal question unless the court were to entertain the admittedly tenu-
ous argument that a denial of a state guarantee to counsel resulted in
a denial of equal protection of the laws.
It is submitted that an essential initial determination in a habeas
'3316 U.S. 455 (1942).
7 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
- Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957), court not concerned with whether
state had to appoint counsel, concern is whether state deprived petitioner of funda-
mental fairness; U.S. ex rel Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948), court puts
aside question of whether petitioner was entitled to counsel since he had one of his
own choice, and assumes a federal right to counsel which right is satisfied when the
court makes an appointment or accepts appearance of counsel.
'1 Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 869 (1945);
U.S. ex rel. Skinner v. Robinson, 105 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.Ill. 1952) ; Soulia v. O'Brien,
94 F. Supp. 764 (D.Mass. 1950) ; af'd 188 F.2d 233 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied 341
U.S. 928 (1951) ; U.S. ex rel. Hall v. Ragen, 60 F.Supp. 820 (N.D.Ill. 1945) ; Coates
v. Lawrence, 46 F.Supp. 414 (S.D.Ga. 1942), aff'd 131 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied 318 U.S. 759 (1943).
"0 Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 874
(1945).
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corpus proceeding of the Lunce variety should be whether the four-
teenth amendment guaranteed the particular petitioner effective repre-
sentation by counsel, and only if it is found that the circumstances
required such representation should the court undertake an examination
into competence of counsel.
THE PROCEDURAL DEVICE OF HABEAS CoRPus
The prisoner who seeks to overturn his conviction by attacking the
competence of his counsel will find the writ of habeas corpus to be an
appropriate weapon. In the case where the attorney who represented
the defendant at trial is the same attorney who took his appeal, the
issue of incompetence hardly will have been raised on appeal. The acts
or omissions which are alleged to constitute the incompetence may not
appear on the record. In a habeas corpus proceeding the court is not
limited to a review of the record. The defendant will probably not
become aware of the fact that he may attack his conviction by showing
incompetence of counsel until after he has been imprisoned pursuant
to a final judgment.
The availability of habeas corpus as a procedural device for raising
the issue of competence of counsel now appears to be established. Tra-
ditionally the writ was available to the prisoner when the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over the person or the offense. In Frank v. Man-
grum" the Supreme Court observed that the writ will lie where the
judgment under which the prisoner is detained is shown to be abso-
lutely void for want of jurisdiction in the trial court, either because
such jurisdiction was absent at the beginning of the trial or because
it was lost during the course of the proceedings. In the later decision
of Johnson v. Zerbst' the Supreme Court applied the loss of jurisdic-
tion reasoning advanced in the Mangrum case and held that the right
to counsel is jurisdictional and that when an accused not represented
by counsel has not intelligently waived that right, the trial court loses
jurisdiction to proceed and its judgment is void. The Johnson case
arose in the federal system and provides authority for the proposition
that lack of representation by counsel in a federal trial is jurisdictional
and may properly be raised by petition for habeas corpus.
In 1867 the Congress provided that federal justices and judges should
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any
person may be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution,
1237 U.S. 309 (1915).
12304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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or of any treaty or law of the United States. 3 This provision has re-
mained without important change and is now found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (c) (3), which extends the writ to persons in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Most
of the Lunce type cases which discuss availability of the writ for
raising incompetence of counsel conclude that the writ lies where the
petitioner has been imprisoned in violation of a constitutional right
and do not employ the loss of jurisdiction theory advanced in the
Johnson case.14
Before a state prisoner may seek his release in federal district court
he must satisfy the statutory requirement of exhaustion of state reme-
dies." Judicial interpretation of the statutory requisite of exhaustion
of state remedies has resulted in a confused body of case law, and the
statutory provision has thus failed to achieve its purpose." Certiorari
to the Supreme Court has been held to be a necessary step in exhaustion
of state remedies." If the state provides more than one type of post-
conviction relief, resort to only one of those has been held to satisfy
the exhaustion requirement.'"
ALLEGATIONS OF INCOMPETENCE
In seeking federal writs of habeas corpus the spectrum of incompe-
tence allegations ranges from general incompetence" through specific
allegations of misfeasance or non-feasance in the particular trial, to
allegations of inaptitude to practice law.'" Specific allegations of in-
competence have included illiteracy, " failure to move for change of
1314 STAT. 385.
14 Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) ; U.S. ex reL. Hall v. Ragen,
60 F.Supp. 820 (N.D.IUl. 1945) ; U.S. ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F.Supp. 265 (N.D.Ill.
1943) ; Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F.Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1942), aff'd 131 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1942), cert. denied 318 U.S. 759 (1943). But see Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d
101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 874 (1945).
I" 28 U.S.C. 2254. "State custody; remedies in State courts. An application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of
available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
1 Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R.5649 (1955).
17 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 217 (1949).
Is Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952).
1 Soulia v. O'Brien, 94 F.Supp. 764 (D.Mass. 1950), aff'd 188 F.2d 233 (1st Cir.
1951), cert. denied 341 U.S. 928 (1951).
- U.S. ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
21 Sweet v. Howard, 155 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 336 U.S. 950 (1949).
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venue or for continuance, 22 inexperience,2 3 failure to introduce certain
evidence or to object to admission of state's evidence," failure to
subpoena or call certain defense witnesses," failure to cross-examine
certain state's witnesses, 6 failure to move for separation of witnesses,"7
failure to file timely appeal," failure to object to jury instructions,2 '
failure to request certain favorable instructions,"0 failure to save ex-
ceptions,"' failure to challenge sufficiency of affidavit,2 inducing defend-
ant to plead guilty,3 recommending that defendant not take the stand,"4
insufficient preparation for trial,3 5 being a member of the Negro race"'
and nervousness at trial followed the next day by an insanity commit-
ment." The allegations of incompetence made by state prisoners are
similar to those advanced by federal prisoners although the ingenuity
of the state prisoner has not been found to measure up to that of one
federal prisoner who alleged counsel was preoccupied owing to recent
notice of induction under the Selective Service Act and so was unable
effectively to try the case."
The contention that counsel was incompetent has been effective to
secure release in only one case other than the Lunce case. In U. S. ex
rel Hall v. Ragen"9 the district court discharged from state confinement
a prisoner who was represented at trial by a doctor licensed to practice
2 U.S. ex teL. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Sweet v. Howard,
supra note 21; Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F.Supp. 414 (S.D.Ga. 1942), aff'd 131 F.2d 110
(5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied 318 U.S. 759 (1943).
23 Farrell v. Lanagen, 166 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied 334 U.S. 853
(1948) ; Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S.
874 (1945) ; Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941).
24 Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) ; U.S. ex rel Hamby v. Ragen,
178 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 905 (1950) ; U.S. eX rel Weber v.
Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 809 (1949).
25 U.S. ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Burkett v. Mayo,
173 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Sweet v. Howard, 155 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied 336 U.S. U.S. 950 (1949); Casey v. Overlade, 129 F.Supp. 433 (N.D.Ind.
1955); U.S. ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F.Supp. 265 (N.D.Ill. 1943), rev'd 143 F.2d
774 (7th Cir. 1944).
26 Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 869 (1945).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) ; U.S. ex rel Weber v. Ragen,
176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 809 (1949).
30 Lunce v. Overlade, supra note 29.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
3 U.S. ex rel Foley v. Ragen, 52 F.Supp. 265 (N.D.Ill. 1943), rev'd 143 F.2d 774
(7th Cir. 1944).
34 Casey v. Overlade, 129 F.Supp. 433 (N.D.Ind. 1955).
25 U.S. ex reL Thompson v. Dye, 103 F.Supp. 776 (W.D.Pa. 1952), aff'd 203 F.2d
429 (3rd Cir. 1953).36 Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941).
37 U.S. ex reL Skinner v. Robinson, 105 F.Supp. 153 (E.D.Ill. 1952).
28 Morton v. Welch, 162 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1947).
39 60 F.Supp. 820 (N.D.Il1. 1945).
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law. During the Hall trial the doctor-attorney repeatedly asked incom-
petent questions to which the trial judge repeatedly sustained objec-
tions. The trial degenerated into a tri-party argument among the attor-
ney, the state's attorney and the trial judge. The attorney-doctor left
the case at the time the jury retired and petitioner was without counsel
at verdict and sentencing. In releasing the petitioner the district court
held he had been denied due process by the ignorance of his attorney
and by the fact that the trial was permitted to proceed to verdict and
judgment without counsel representing defendant.
The district and circuit court opinions which have met and disposed
of incompetence contentions certainly cannot be said to present a uni-
form approach to the problem. Because attempts to secure writs of
habeas corpus on the ground that counsel was incompetent have for
the most part been unsuccessful, an analysis of the opinions, of neces-
sity, assumes a negative tenor. However, from the cases as a whole
several significant propositions emerge. Bar membership in good stand-
ing is prima facie evidence of competence, and one seeking to establish
incompetence must allege incompetence and prove his allegations with
probative evidence. Youth and lack of experience do not constitute in-
competence. Measures which appear in retrospect to have been errors
in judgment or trial strategy do not constitute incompetence. Lack of
skill and even negligence do not constitute incompetence. If any affirma-
tive principle arises from these cases it would seem to be that an
accused tried by a state court is denied due process of law only when
his counsel was so incompetent that in reality there was no representa-
tion at all. Unless and until more decisions come down in which courts
hold incompetence has been established, it will not be possible to be
definitive concerning the degree of incompetence which is tantamount
to no representation at all.
SELECTED AND APPOINTED COUNSEL
Language in some opinions implies that there is a constitutional dis-
tinction between representation by court-appointed counsel and repre-
sentation by counsel of defendant's own choice as to the question of
denial of due process.4" Some courts have met the issue squarely and
have resolved it by holding that the acts of defendant's chosen counsel
are imputed to the defendant with the result that the defendant cannot
acquiesce in the conduct of his defense and then later successfully
4'Farrell v. Lanagan, 166 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied 334 U.S. 853
(1948) ; Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 874
(1945) ; Casey v. Overlade, 129 F.Supp. 433 (N.D.Ind. 1955).
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contend that incompetence of counsel resulted in a denial of due
process.4 ' Prior to the Lunce case, the courts adopting the imputation
theory would except from the operation of that theory a case where
chosen counsel was so incompetent that there was in effect no repre-
sentation at all.
A holding that the degree of incompetence necessary to work a
denial of due process is greater in the case where the counsel was
employed by or for the defendant than in the case where the counsel
was appointed by the court is of course a conclusion. A probable theory
for this conclusion is that in controlling to this extent the conduct of
his defense the defendant has waived his constitutional guarantee of
effective representation by counsel and therefore there has been no
state denial of due process.
In the Lunce case the court accepted the proposition advanced in
previous cases, that generally an accused cannot proceed to trial with
counsel of his own choice and then later claim a denial of due process
chargeable to the state. The theory of the Lunce case is not new; the
case differed from previous ones only in that the circuit court viewed
the alleged incompetence as being sufficient to bring the case within
the limited area in which due process operates when a defendant is
represented by counsel of his own choice.
CONCLUSIONS
Even the most liberal student of constitutional law must concede
that a concept so elastic and nebulous as that of procedural due process
admits of finality at some stage. When an accused has raised the issue
of incompetence on appeal and/or in an attempt to seek relief by a
state post-conviction process it may well be argued that he has been
accorded his due. When the question of incompetence has been deter-
mined on the merits by a state court, it would seem even clearer that
the defendant has been accorded ample opportunity to litigate this
issue. Our whole system of superimposed federal jurisdiction contem-
plates that the state judge will heed the command of article VI of the
Constitution and recognize that the Constitution and laws of the United
States are the supreme law of the land and that he will be bound
thereby.
In theory the writ of habeas corpus is not available to review the
41 U.S. ex re. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1952), two judges refused
to give significance to the distinction; Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied 324 U.S. 869 (1945) ; Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F.Supp. 561 (N.D.Ind.
1955).
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judgment of a state court, but when the federal court adjudicates a
question already determined on the merits by a state court the realities
of the situation are not in accord with the theory. Any legislative cur-
tailment of federal review of state convictions must of course issue
from the Congress, and to date such attempted curtailment has met
with failure.2
It is noted that many defendants have sought writs of certiorari to
obtain Supreme Court review of a state's rejection of incompetence
contentions. In view of the certiorari policy of the United States Su-
preme Court" it is difficult to conclude from a denial of certiorari any
more than that it has been denied. Certainly a denial of certiorari does
not amount to an approval of the disposition made by the state court.
However, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the denial in state
incompetence cases does reflect a disposition on the part of the Supreme
Court to refuse to try the defense counsel. If this is an accurate ap-
praisal of the policy of the Supreme Court it would seem clear that
the federal district courts should expedite this policy by refusing to
examine into the competence of counsel except perhaps in very extreme
cases where the state court has not disposed of the issue on the merits.
Under the reasoning of the Lunce opinion, the state trial court is
put in a difficult, if not impossible, position. If the representation is
found by a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding to have been
of such low caliber as to have called for state intervention, then the
failure to have intervened amounts to a denial of due process. But if
the trial court does intervene between an accused and his counsel it is
entirely possible that a federal court might later find that the interven-
tion itself was a denial of due process.
The trial judge and the prosecuting attorney are present at the time
of the events constituting the alleged incompetence. It would therefore
seem that failure to intervene should be viewed as a finding that counsel
was competent, a finding to be given much weight, or even to be viewed
as conclusive in the later federal habeas corpus proceeding.
42 H.R. 5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
43 United States Supreme Court Rules, Rule 19.
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